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ABSTRACT. We exploit a brief period of asymmetric information during the implementation of
Pennsylvania’s “report card” scheme for coronary artery bypass graft surgery to test for improve-
ments in quality of care and selection of patients by health care providers. During the ﬁrst three
years of the 1990s, providers in Pennsylvania had an incentive to bias report cards by selecting
patients strategically, with patients having no access to the report cards. This dichotomy enables
us to separate providers’ selection of patients from patients’ selection of providers.
Using data from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample, we estimate a non–linear difference–in–
differences model and derive asymptotic standard errors. The mortality rate for bypass patients
decreases by only 0.05 percentage points due to the report cards, which we interpret as evidence
thatqualityofbypasssurgerydidnotimprove(atleastintheshort–term)nordidpatientselection
by providers occur. Our timing, estimation, and asymptotics are readily applicable to many other
report card schemes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Quality “report cards” for health care providers are pervasive in health policy. Two common
and open questions regarding the intended and unintended effects of report cards are: Do report
cards lead to genuine improvements in quality of care and thus patient outcomes? Do report
cards induce providers to select patients? It is difﬁcult in empirical analysis to address these
questions separately from each other. We propose to answer them jointly. Perhaps the most–
studied report cards are those for providers of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery in
the United States (U.S.). New York and Pennsylvania were the ﬁrst states to publish results in
the early 1990s. If providers of CABG surgery, in response to the introduction of report cards,
indeed improved quality of care while simultaneously engaging in strategic patient selection
then we would expect, keeping patient characteristics ﬁxed, a noticeable reduction in mortality
outcomes for bypass patients.
1 If however, as we ﬁnd here, the change in mortality is sufﬁciently
close to zero then we conclude that neither quality improvements nor patient selection occurred.
Our empirical analysis contributes to the literature in two ways. First, report cards can induce
selection behavior not only by providers but also by patients (which is a major reason for their
existence). Researchtodatehasignoredthepossibilitythatoncereportcardsarepublished, both
providers and patients could engage in mutual selection. For example, in the most inﬂuential
study to date, Dranove et al. (2003) use the publication date of CABG report cards for New
York and Pennsylvania as the cut–off point in a difference–in–differences analysis. Using a
comprehensive longitudinal Medicare claims data set, combined with data from the American
Hospital Association, they show that the average illness severity of bypass patients decreases
by 3.47%–5.30% due to the introduction of CABG report cards, concluding that providers shift
treatment from sicker patients to healthier ones. However, it is not clear to what extent the
decrease in illness severity is due to selection of patients by providers or selection of providers
by patients.
We propose a simple remedy that isolates selection of patients by providers. Figure 1 presents
the particular timing of CABG report cards as implemented in Pennsylvania in the early 1990s.
Before 1990 (period 0), there were no CABG report cards in Pennsylvania. Between January
1990 and November 1992 (period 1), the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council
(PHC4) collected data on mortality outcomes and the characteristics of bypass patients. During
that period, no report cards were published, making patient selection based on report cards
impossible. After November 1992 (period 2), the PHC4 published the report cards and patients
were able to access the results.
Ourremedyinordertoisolateproviderselectionofpatientsfrompatientselectionofproviders,
consists of ignoring period 2 and focusing on a comparison of period 1 and period 0 only.
2 It
is during period 1 that providers may have an incentive to select patients strategically, while at
1We use the terms “CABG” and “bypass” synonymously. Two other terms that we use interchangeably are
“provider” and “hospital”.
2The timing suggested here is distinct from what is commonly referred to as Ashenfelter’s (1978) dip, which
refers to a change in individuals’ behavior in anticipation of a treatment. Here, in period 1, the treatment (collection
of report card data) is already in progress. Health care providers have a real incentive to adjust their behavior during
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the same time the report card cannot have inﬂuenced patients’ choice of providers.
3 Providers
in Pennsylvania were aware that data was being collected during period 1. The PHC4 man-
dated that hospitals use an automated system, called MedisGroups, for collecting and analyzing
clinical data and, as a result, hospitals submitted data to the PHC4 every quarter. At the same
time, hospitals also knew, at every step of the process, the plans and intentions of the PHC4.
The council consisted of 21 members with representatives from business, labor, hospitals, in-
surers, medicine, health maintenance organizations, and consumer groups. The PHC4 took an
altogether consultative and collaborating approach in working with the medical community (see
Sessa and Bentley 1992 and Sirio et al. 1996).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Asecondinnovationofourpaperconcernstheestimation. Weestimateanon–lineardifference–
in–differences model under an asymptotic framework in which the number of groups is small
but group sizes are large (few large groups). The non–linear framework is necessary because the
dependent variable is a mortality dummy (equal to 1 if a patient dies during hospitalization and 0
otherwise) and the mortality incidence for bypass patients is a low probability event—less than
6% of patients who undergo CABG surgery die. Therefore, ﬁtting a non–linear model avoids
the problem of predictions outside the unit interval that linear probability models face. Fur-
ther, the report cards are constructed based on logistic models, lending a non–linear estimation
framework further validity.
An asymptotic framework of few large groups is required because the policy variable of
interest—whether or not a report card policy is in place—does not vary at the individual patient
level, but at the state/year level and we only observe few such groups (altogether 52 combina-
tions of states and years). Moulton (1990) highlights the threat to inference when explanatory
variables—particularly the policy variable of interest—are constant among members of a group
(for example, a state during a certain year). Donald and Lang (2007) reiterate this point and pro-
pose a simple two–step procedure that achieves correct inference when the number of groups is
small and the group size (that is, the number of patients within each state/year group) is large.
Wooldridge (2006) proposes a two–stage minimum distance estimator, which, under few large
group asymptotics, is expected to yield stronger inference than the Donald and Lang approach.
For our estimation, Wooldridge’s estimation strategy is preferable for two further reasons: it is
adaptable to non–linear models and it makes inference of average partial effects possible—an
important parameter in non–linear models. We derive the asymptotic properties of the efﬁcient
non–linear two–stage minimum distance estimator and the average partial effects separately in
the Appendix.
How can providers select patients? They can pursue two broad strategies: shifting bad–
risk patients out of CABG surgery and/or shifting good–risk patients into CABG surgery. In
both cases, the observed mortality rate for CABG surgery will decrease as a result. As in
Dranove et al. (2003), we assume that there exists a non–degenerate subset of patients admitted
3We do not rule out the possibility that patients choose providers (for example, through word–of–mouth or
through recommendation by general practitioners). This type of selection is allowed to be present during all pe-
riods: 0, 1, and 2. The only assumption we need to make is that this type of selection is not affected by the report
cards.4 Y. CHEN, J. MEINECKE
toeachhospitalwithheartproblemsqualifyingforbothCABGsurgeryandadifferentprocedure
(for example, percutaneous coronary angioplasty). Therefore, providers have some degree of
freedominchoosingtheclinicalprocedureforastrictandnon–emptysubsetofallheartpatients.
As such, the introduction of the report card policy affects providers’ decisions monotonically:
the likelihood that a bad–risk patient receives a substitute treatment rather than CABG is weakly
increasing (or non–decreasing) due to the report cards; the likelihood for a good–risk patient is
weakly decreasing (or non–increasing).
Providers cannot effectively select patients into or out of CABG surgery based on their ob-
servable characteristics because report cards are risk–adjusted. For example, providers that shift
CABG surgery from older to younger patients will not bias report cards in their favor because
age is controlled for in the construction of the report cards. Instead, rational providers have to
use information that is not known by the report card authority. For example, a provider observes
that a patient suffers from hypertension and that the patient has a family history of hyperten-
sion. While the hypertension itself is not a reason for avoiding the patient (because the report
card authority risk–adjusts for hypertension), the fact that there is a known family history could
convince the provider to avoid the patient (and offer a substitute treatment instead).
This selection of patients by providers could lead to econometric complications. As selection
could change the composition of the patient pool for CABG surgery, we need to assume that
observable patient characteristics do not change due to the report cards. Technically, the private
(and unobserved by the report card authority) information that providers use for the selection
of patients cannot be correlated with the observable characteristics of the patients. We provide
empirical evidence that this indeed is the case. Patient characteristics are mostly unaffected by
the report cards, and in the few cases in which they are affected, the resulting bias works against
us, affording our estimation results a conservative interpretation.
Using the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) data from the U.S. Agency for Health Care
Policy and Research and comparing period 0 to period 1, we do not ﬁnd any evidence of im-
provement in the quality of care for or provider selection of bypass patients. Average illness
severity of patients in Pennsylvania decreases slightly due to the report cards, but not signiﬁ-
cantly. Translated into mortality rates, we ﬁnd the probability that Pennsylvanian patients un-
dergoing CABG surgery will die decreases by at most only 0.05 percentage points under the
report card scheme. We also explore whether hospital or patient heterogeneity played a role in
explaining selection. In both cases, we ﬁnd small effects that are statistically indistinguishable
from zero.
Providers may not select patients for at least three reasons. First, the report cards trade off
mortality outcomes and patient volume measures. Chen (2011), using a signaling model, shows
that low–quality providers cannot successfully imitate high–quality providers and as a result do
not participate in patient selection. Second, providers may not have access to valuable private
information that would enable them to select patients effectively. The report card authority uses
a rich data set that may function as a sufﬁcient statistic for any private information that providers
possess. Third, providers may be altruistic. Theoretical models of impure competition predict
that non–proﬁt hospitals compete for public goodwill by supplying charity care. Empirical
evidence for Pennsylvania supports this view (see Rosko 2004).REPORT CARDS AND PROVIDER STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 5
The lack of quality improvements in bypass surgery may be explained by time. Given the
short time frame available for our analysis, it seems possible that any steps undertaken by hos-
pitals to improve quality of care had not manifested in lower mortality rates. Further, it may not
be optimal for all hospitals to invest in technologies that improve the quality of bypass surgery.
If the quality difference between hospitals is sufﬁciently large then a low–quality hospital does
not have an incentive to improve the quality of bypass surgery because it will never be able to
imitate a high–quality hospital (see Gravelle and Sivey 2010).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy explains the background of
Pennsylvania’s hospital report card scheme and describes and summarizes the NIS data. Section
3 lays out the estimation framework, while Section 4 contains the results, and Section 5 provides
a discussion. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix gives the details of the two–stage estimation
and derives asymptotic results for estimators, including the average partial effects.
2. BACKGROUND AND DATA
In 1986, the state of Pennsylvania passed a law (under Act 89) that established the Pennsylva-
nia Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4), with one of its main responsibilities being
“to collect, analyze and make available to the public data about the cost and quality of health
care in Pennsylvania.” In November 1992, the PHC4 published their ﬁrst report on CABG
surgery. The report provides risk–adjusted information on the health outcomes (in particular
mortality) of bypass patients at hospital and surgeon level. One motivation of collecting health
data and issuing report cards, as stated in PHC4 (1998), is the incentive for providers “to take
steps to improve the overall quality of bypass surgery.”
The report cards are supposed to evaluate the quality of a provider (or surgeon). Quality is
measured by the mortality rate of a provider’s bypass patients controlling for risk factors. The
PHC4 research panel suggests running a logistic regression, in which the dependent variable is
a dummy equal to 1 if a patient dies during his hospital stay, on a set of covariates that fall into
two categories: demographic and clinical. Demographic variables include age and gender, while
clinical variables include diabetes or if a person had a cardiogenic shock (for further details see
PHC4 1998).
Giventheresultsfromthenon–linearestimation, thereportcardssummarize, foreachprovider,
whether the actual mortality rate falls below or above the predicted mortality rate (adjusted for
standard errors). Therefore, a provider can either be below, above or in line with the expected
mortality rate. This quality evaluation is also performed for individual surgeons.
4
We use the U.S. Agency for Health Care Policy and Research’s NIS Release 1 data, which
span from 1988 to 1992. Designed to approximate a 20 percent sample of U.S. community
hospitals each year, the NIS is a stratiﬁed probability sample of hospitals in the participating
states, with sampling probabilities proportional to the number of community hospitals in each
stratum.
5
4Epstein (2006) provides an extensive discussion of the background.
5As deﬁned by the American Hospital Association, community hospitals are “all nonfederal, short-term, general
and other specialty hospitals, excluding hospital units of institutions”. The strata are constructed based on ﬁve
hospital characteristics: ownership/control, bed size, teaching status, urban/rural location, and U.S. region.6 Y. CHEN, J. MEINECKE
Table 1 lists the combinations of states and years for which we have data. We observe eleven
states—eight states for the years 1988–1992 and three states (including Pennsylvania) for the
years 1989–1992. For the year 1988, we have information on 759 hospitals, with an overall
number of in–patient stays of more than ﬁve million. For each year between 1989 and 1992 we
have information on more than 850 hospitals with an overall number of in–patient stays of more
than six million.
We narrow the sample to patients aged 65–99. This restriction has the advantage of a majority
of patients being covered by Medicare, rather than by a private insurance or health maintenance
organization (HMO), which may restrict the ﬂexibility of providers in assigning treatment (due
to pre–negotiated agreements). This in turn would reduce providers’ opportunities for selection
of patients. In the subset of Pennsylvanian bypass patients aged 65-99, more than 92% are
covered by Medicare during the years 1990–1992.
6
[Table 1 about here.]
We further narrow the sample to patients who received one of the following nine princi-
pal diagnoses: acute myocardial infarction, coronary atherosclerosis, non–speciﬁc chest pain,
pulmonary heart disease, other and ill-deﬁned heart disease, conduction disorders, cardiac dys-
rhythmias, cardiacarrestandventricularﬁbrillation, orcongestiveheartfailure(non–hypertensive).
These nine principal diagnoses cover almost 98% of all bypass patients within that age range.
Overall, our sample contains 952,200 heart patients.
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of patient characteristics for the control states. About
52% of patients are male and 85% are white, while the average age is 75 years. Almost half
of the sample entered the hospital as an emergency admission, a third as urgent, and 15% as
elective.
[Table 2 about here.]
The table also lists descriptive statistics on three principal clinical procedures that we use
in the estimation: CABG, percutaneous coronary angioplasty (PTCA), and diagnostic cardiac
catheterization (CATH). Only those patients who received CABG as the principal procedure are
the subject of the report cards. Following Dranove et al. (2003), we regard the PTCA proce-
dure as the primary substitute treatment for CABG and the CATH procedure as a diagnostic
procedure that complements CABG.
Table 2 shows that the incidence of CABG surgery in the control states starts out at 11.2%
in 1988 and slowly rises to 12.9% in 1992. The probability of receiving PTCA increases at a
markedly steeper rate than for CABG, equaling 7.5% in 1988 and growing to 12.5% by 1992.
The CATH procedure is more common, at 16.7% in 1988, increasing slowly to 18.0% in 1992.
Looking at mortality rates, the table reveals that heart patients are less likely to die over time
across all three principal procedures. The mortality rates of patients who receive CABG surgery
drop from 5.8% in 1988 to 4.5% by 1992. For PTCA and CATH the numbers are similar, both
starting out at 2.1% and declining to 1.6% and 1.8%.
6Ideally, we would like to restrict the sample to only Medicare patients. However, the NIS data for Pennsylva-
nia does not report payor information for the year 1989—the only pre–treatment year available for that state. By
restricting the sample to over 65–year–olds, we minimize the contamination that may result from private insurance
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Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for Pennsylvania. Demographically, Pennsylvania
is similar to the control states: about half of patients are male and the average age is around 74
years (information on race is not available). At about 59%, Pennsylvania does have a higher
number of emergency admissions than the control states. This holds for before and after the
treatment (with collection of report card data starting in 1990). Conversely, the number of ur-
gent admissions is lower at around 20%–22%. Comparing the sum of emergency and urgent
admissions between the control states and Pennsylvania, the difference is small. The discrep-
ancy in emergency and urgent admissions when looked at individually may be due to different
reporting requirements. The percentage of elective admissions in Pennsylvania grows slowly
over time, from 15.3% in 1989 to 17.6% by 1992.
[Table 3 about here.]
Regarding the clinical variables, the levels and trends in Pennsylvania are arguably similar to
the control states. Table 3 shows that the incidence of CABG surgery in Pennsylvania begins at
10.8% in 1989 (almost exactly at the level of the control states) and rises to 13.7% by 1992 (0.8
percentage points above the control states). The probability of receiving PTCA increases from
7.1% in 1989, growing to 11.2% by 1992. The probability of receiving CATH rises from 15.4%
in 1989 to 18.1% by 1992.
Looking at mortality rates, the difference between Pennsylvania and the control states is,
again, not large. CABG mortality in Pennsylvania begins slightly higher at 5.8% in 1989 (com-
pared to 5.4%) and decreases to 4.7% in 1992 (compared to 4.5%). For PTCA, there is a drop
from 1.7% to 1.0% between 1989 and 1990 and an increase back to 1.7% by 1992. For CATH
there is a slight decrease from 1.8% to 1.5% between 1989 and 1992.
Contrasting Tables 2 and 3 offers a preview of our main estimation results. We do not ﬁnd,
when looking at aggregate numbers at the state level, that there is a signiﬁcant drop in the
mortality rates of bypass patients in Pennsylvania during the years 1990 to 1992 relative to the
control states. Finding such a decline would be consistent with both improvements in patient
care and hospital selection of patients. Instead we ﬁnd that both control states and Pennsylvania
follow similar downward trends in mortality for CABG, but also for PTCA and CATH. We
conclude that there is no sufﬁcient evidence for quality improvement or provider selection of
patients. The estimation results below will formally conﬁrm this view.
3. ESTIMATION
3.1. Patient Illness Severity and Mortality. We estimate the effect of a hospital report card
policy on the illness severity and mortality of bypass patients. While Dranove et al. (2003)
use total inpatient hospital expenditures for the year prior to admission as a proxy measure for
illness severity, we follow the direction proposed by Elixhauser et al. (1998) who construct
patient illness severity from administrative data. As the measure of mortality, we use actual
in–hospital mortality (that is, whether or not a patient died during hospitalization). The PHC4
used the same dependent variable in the construction of its report cards.
Consider the following four–level hierarchical model for the conditional mortality probability
Pr(mihst = 1jchst;zihst) = F
 




; (3.1)8 Y. CHEN, J. MEINECKE
where chst is a vector of covariates that vary at the hospital level, zihst is a vector of covariates
that vary at the individual level, mihst is a mortality dummy variable that equals 1 if a patient
died during hospitalization and 0 otherwise, and pst is a policy dummy variable that equals 1
if the state corresponds to Pennsylvania during 1990–1992 and 0 otherwise. The parameter m
is a constant, while as and bt are ﬁxed effects at the state and year levels. The coefﬁcient b
represents the effect of the hospital report card policy on the dependent variable. Our objective
is to estimate b. We restrict the sample to all patients admitted to hospital between January
1988 and October 1992 (report cards in Pennsylvania were published in November 1992) who
received CABG surgery.
Theestimationneedstoreﬂectthatthepolicyvariableofinterest—whetherornotreportcards
are in place—does not vary at the individual level but only across states over time. At the same
timeweobserveonlyelevenstates—eightofthemfor theyears1988–1992andthreeofthemfor
the years 1989–1992. This gives 52 state/year groups altogether. A difference–in–differences
analysis based on only 52 observations would result in estimates with large standard errors.
However, within each state/year group there are a large number of inpatient stays. Therefore,
we apply an asymptotic framework of few large groups.
Moulton (1990) was the ﬁrst to point out the threat to inference when explanatory variables
(particularly the policy variable of interest) are constant among members of a group (for exam-
ple, in a state during a certain year). Donald and Lang (2007) reiterate this point and propose a
simple two–step procedure that achieves correct inference when the number of groups is small
and the group sizes (that is, the number of patients within each state/year group) are large.
Wooldridge (2006) proposes a two–stage minimum distance estimator, which, under few large
group asymptotics, is expected to yield stronger inference than the Donald and Lang approach.
For our estimation, Wooldridge’s estimation strategy is preferable for two further reasons: it
can be applied in a straightforward manner to non–linear models and it has the advantage that
inference on average partial effects, a common parameter of interest in non–linear models, can
be derived readily.7
For the function F() we consider both the identity function (which yields the linear probabil-
ity model) and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the logistic distribution. We include
the linear probability model because it lends the two–stage estimation procedure an intuitive
interpretation. Our main results hold for both the linear and non–linear speciﬁcations. However,
we believe that the logistic speciﬁcation is preferable because it guarantees conditional prob-
abilities within the unit interval and because the actual construction of the report cards by the
PHC4 was based on the logit model.
First–Stage Estimation. The estimation proceeds in two stages (all technical details on estima-
tion and inference are deferred to the Appendix). First, deﬁne
dst := m +as+bt + pstb; (3.2)
7Hansen (2007a) derives properties of the standard covariance matrix estimator in panel data models. Hansen
(2007b) presents generalized least squares estimation of a multilevel panel data model with autocorrelation. Both
papers cover linear models only and do not extend to asymptotics in which the number of groups is small and the
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and rewrite equation (3.1) more compactly as







The last equation summarizes the strategy for the ﬁrst–stage estimation: pooling data across
time for each state, we obtain within–estimates of dst (along with fs and gs). For each state/year
group we observe a rich set of demographic and clinical characteristics. Table 4 lists the vari-
ables included in chst and zihst.
Regarding the clinical characteristics included in zihst, we translated a large array of ICD-9-
CM procedure codes into meaningful comorbidities. We borrow from Elixhauser et al. (1998),
who, based on typical clinical discharge abstract data, provide a mapping from ICD-9-CM pro-
cedure codes to comorbidities. For example, ICD-9-CM procedure code 196.0 can be translated
to the comorbidity metastatic cancer.
[Table 4 about here.]
The mapping from ICD-9-CM procedure codes to comorbidities is not injective. Different
ICD-9-CM procedure codes can map to the same comorbidity. Altogether, Elixhauser et al.
(1998) deﬁne 30 different comorbidities, most of which rarely occur in bypass patients. We
focus on the ﬁve comorbidities that occur most frequently in bypass patients: peripheral vascular
disorders, hypertension, chronic pulmonary disease, diabetes (uncomplicated), and ﬂuid and
electrolyte disorders.8 In addition, we include a dummy variable if a patient received a diagnosis
of acute myocardial infarction (AMI or heart attack) and a dummy variable if complications
occurred during surgery (as deﬁned in Elixhauser et al. 1998).
Second–Stage Estimation. The parameter dst has an intuitive interpretation when F() is the
identity function. It gives the expected mortality rate for bypass patients in state s during year t
when chst = 0 and zihst = 0. We can therefore regard dst as a measure of average illness severity
for bypass patients in state s during year t. This interpretation of dst as a measure of average
illness severity also applies when F() is the cdf of the logistic distribution (because of the
monotonicity of the cdf). However, in this case we cannot interpret dst as a probability because
the model is non–linear. Consequently, we alternatively derive average partial effects below.
With estimates of dst in hand, we use efﬁcient minimum distance estimation in the second
stage to obtain ˆ b based on equation (3.2) (see Appendix). For the linear model, we interpret
the estimate of b as the causal effect of the report card policy on the average illness severity of
Pennsylvanian bypass patients. For the non–linear model, we can give a tangible interpretation
to the causal effect of hospital report cards by calculating the average partial effect at the patient
level. Our two–stage estimation has the advantage that we can plug the estimate ˆ b back into
equation (3.1) to calculate the effect of hospital report cards on the average mortality rates of
patients. Speciﬁcally, we answer the following two questions:
(A) For Pennsylvanian bypass patients who were admitted to a hospital in 1989 (before re-
port cards), by how much would their average mortality rate have changed had they been
admitted during the years 1990–1992 instead?
8Results do not change qualitatively and only slightly quantitatively when we include additional comorbidities.10 Y. CHEN, J. MEINECKE
(B) For Pennsylvanian bypass patients who were admitted to a hospital during the years 1990–
1992 (during report card data collection), by how much would their average mortality rate
have changed had they been admitted in 1989 instead?
Formally, both questions are addressed by the following objects:
APEA := AMR01 AMR00
APEB := AMR11 AMR10;










































js = PA;t  1990

: (3.4)
The effects APEA and APEB correspond to questions (A) and (B) above and are the average
partial effects of the report card policy on mortality rates. We estimate APEA and APEB not
only for the subset of patients who received CABG surgery, but also for the subset of patients
who received PTCA or CATH.
Derivation of Standard Errors. For all estimators in the ﬁrst and second stage we derive ana-
lytical standard errors via the delta method in the Appendix. In particular, we provide standard
errors for ˆ dst for all s and t obtained from the ﬁrst–stage logit estimation of equation (3.3). For
the second–stage minimum distance estimation we adjust the standard errors because the depen-
dent variable, based on equation (3.2), is constructed from the estimates ˆ dst. Further, to conduct
inference on the average partial effects, APEA and APEB, we derive the asymptotic expansions
of all [ AMRpq for p;q 2 f0;1g, which enables us to calculate the exact asymptotic distributions
for the average partial effects.
3.2. Patient Characteristics. The ﬁrst–stage or within–estimations based on equation (3.3)
are valid only if no unobserved heterogeneity feeds through to patient characteristics. To bias
report cards in their favor, providers cannot select patients on observable characteristics: ratio-
nal providers know that report cards will be “risk–adjusted”. Providers can select patients only
based on characteristics that are unobserved by the report card authority (and the econometri-
cian). If the unobserved selection rule that providers apply affects observable characteristics,
then the regressions based on equation (3.3) will yield inconsistent estimates.
We test whether observable patient characteristics change in response to the report cards by
adapting the estimation framework from the previous subsection. We regress each independent
variable contained in the vector of patient characteristics zihst on a constant, a state dummy, a
time dummy, and the policy dummy. Formally, let zr
ihst be the r-th element of the vector zihst.
For example, using Table 4, the element z1
ihst corresponds to the ﬁrst age dummy. Then, for eachREPORT CARDS AND PROVIDER STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 11
independent variable (that is, for each r), we estimate
Pr(zr
ihst = 1) = m +as+bt + pstb = dst; (3.5)
where all deﬁnitions are as before. The estimation of equation (3.5) proceeds as before. In the
ﬁrst stage, we estimate dst := m +as+bt + pstb non–parametrically, using a linear probability
model and a constant term as the only explanatory variable. In the second stage, we estimate b
via efﬁcient minimum distance estimation. If providers select patients on unobservables and if
these unobservables are correlated with patient characteristics then we would expect estimates
of b in equation (3.5) that are signiﬁcantly different from zero.
4. RESULTS
Main Findings. Table 5 shows the results for the patient characteristics regressions from the
preceding subsection. Patient characteristics are unaffected by the report cards in 10 out of 14
cases. Only for the characteristics ‘urgent’, ‘complications’, and for the last comorbidity does
the 95% conﬁdence interval not include zero. However, in all of these three cases the effect of
the observable characteristics biases the results for the conditional mortality rates against us.
[Table 5 about here.]
For example, the report card policy is associated with a decrease in clinical complications.
This could result from genuine improvements in quality of care or provider selection (or both).
In any case, average illness severity and mortality should decline as consequence. However, we
do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant decline.
We now present the results of the mortality regressions from equations (3.2) and (3.3). First,
we focus only on patients who received CABG surgery. We compute ˆ b, the average mortality
rates [ AMRpq for p;q 2 f0;1g and the average partial effects APEA and APEB based on that
subsample of patients. We then repeat the two–stage estimation for the subsample of PTCA and
CATH patients.
Table 6 contains the second–stage estimation results for b from equation (3.2): the causal
effect of the report card policy on the measure of illness severity dst. We do not ﬁnd any causal
effect of report cards on the illness severity of CABG patients. For the linear probability model,
the average mortality rate decreases by 0.0008 due to the report cards. The effect is small and
not statistically signiﬁcant. Likewise, for the logistic model we ﬁnd a non–signiﬁcant effect.
Further, we do not detect any signiﬁcant effect of report cards on the average illness severity of
PTCA or CATH patients.
[Table 6 about here.]
Table 7 contains the estimation results for the AMR and the average partial effects, APEA and
APEB. NumbersfortheAMRarereportedinpercent andnumbersfortheAPRareinpercentage
points. We do not detect any signiﬁcant decrease in mortality rates. For Pennsylvanian bypass
patients during the year 1989 (before report cards), the average mortality rate was AMR00 =
5:84%. Had the report card policy been in place for those patients, the average mortality rate
would have decreased to AMR01 = 5:79%. This difference of APEA =  0:05 percentage points
is small and insigniﬁcant.
[Table 7 about here.]12 Y. CHEN, J. MEINECKE
Conversely, we calculate an average mortality rate of AMR11 =5:00% for Pennsylvanian by-
pass patients during the years 1990–1992. Had the report card policy not been in place for those
patients, the average mortality rate would have increased to AMR10 = 5:05%. This difference
of APEB =  0:05 percentage points is also small and insigniﬁcant.
Qualitatively similar results hold for both the PTCA and CATH procedures. The AMR de-
cline marginally but never signiﬁcantly. If hospitals select low–risk patients for CABG surgery,
we would expect the average mortality rates for either PTCA or CATH (or both) to go up.
Combining all results, we cannot reject the hypothesis that mortality rates remained un-
changed due to the introduction of hospital report cards in Pennsylvania. An intended effect
of report cards is an improved level of care for bypass patients, while an unintended effect is
that hospitals select patients strategically. Both effects should lower mortality rates for CABG
patients. We provide strong empirical support that both effects are statistically indistinguishable
from zero.
Hospital Heterogeneity. It is possible that we do not detect any signiﬁcant selection effects
in the analysis because we deﬁne the treatment group too broadly. It is possible that not all
hospitals in Pennsylvania had an incentive to select patients. If only a subset of hospitals select
patients, then our aggregate analysis could fail in detecting selection.
What type of hospitals had the strongest incentive to select patients? Supposedly, private
for–proﬁt hospitals are exposed to the highest degree of competition and may be more inclined
to select patients. However, virtually all Pennsylvanian hospitals are organized as private non–
proﬁt entities; they are perfectly homogeneous along the ownership–dimension. Therefore,
exploiting variation in ownership status is not a feasible approach for studying the effects of
hospital heterogeneity on selection behavior.
Instead, we focus on the subset of hospitals to which the report cards posed the most im-
mediate threat: those hospitals that prior to the collection of report card data had exceptionally
high CABG mortality rates. That subset of hospitals would have had the strongest incentive to
select patients. For each state, a hospital is classiﬁed as high–mortality if its CABG mortality
belongs to the worst quartile of hospitals during the year 1989.9 We use the year 1989 because
for Pennsylvania this is the only pre–treatment year available in the data. For the worst quartile
of hospitals, we then proceed with the same two–stage estimation described above to test for
patient selection. We then redo this analysis also for the best quartile of hospitals (lowest 25%
CABG mortality) for additional robustness.
To make estimation feasible, we need to make a few small adjustments to the estimation and
data. First, we include hospital ﬁxed effects, which are a more parsimonious way of controlling
for hospital characteristics when we conduct our estimation on a relatively small subset of the
data. Next, we include only hospitals that were observed in both the control period (year 1989)
and the treatment periods (years 1990–1992). Finally, we drop the states of Colorado and Wash-
ington from the sample because they do not have enough hospitals in the data (and we cannot
9We choose quartiles to balance the tradeoff between bias and variance. If, for example, we choose the worst
mortality decile instead then we would end up with too little data, which would adversely affect the variance of the
estimators. If, for example, we choose the median (or the mean) as a cutoff then the bias for the subset of selective
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reasonably assign which hospitals have high mortality rates and which ones have low mortality
rates). Overall, these adjustments decrease the patient sample size for the CABG estimation
from 121,900 to 106,092. Table 8 contains the estimation results of the hospital heterogeneity
estimations. Panel A contains the estimates for the entire adjusted sample. It shows that the
changes to the sample did not affect the results qualitatively and only slightly quantitatively. For
example, the average mortality rate AMR00 decreased from 5.83% by 0.16 percentage points.
The corresponding numbers from the original sample, contained in Panel A of Table 7, are
5.84% with a decrease of 0.05 percentage points. We conjecture that the adjustments to the
estimation and data did not introduce meaningful bias to the estimates.
[Table 8 about here.]
Panels B and C illustrate that there are differences between hospitals. However, they are not
statistically signiﬁcant. Panel B shows the estimation results for the quartile of hospitals with
the highest mortality rates (‘worst 25% hospitals’). The average partial effect decreases by 0.85
(from a high rate of 9.59%) or 0.76 (from a rate of 8.51%) percentage points and is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Likewise, Panel C contains the results for the quartile of hospitals with the
lowest mortality rates (‘best 25% hospitals’). The average partial effects are estimated to be -
0.52 and -0.78 percentage points, also statistically indistinguishable from zero. For both the best
and worst 25% of hospitals, the average partial effects have increased (in absolute value). How-
ever, the difference is small, negative, and statistically insigniﬁcant. The middle two quartiles of
hospitals, by implication (as the residual group), have lower partial effects (in absolute value):
-0.05 and -0.04 percentage points, neither of which is statistically signiﬁcant (numbers not in-
cluded in table). In summary, we cannot corroborate econometrically that hospital heterogeneity
has an effect on selection behavior.
Patient Heterogeneity. Providers have an incentive to select patients, but their opportunity to do
so may be limited. A provider’s ability to select a patient could depend on the admission type
of the patient. Patients who are admitted to a hospital as emergency or urgent cases may be
less likely targets for selection than elective patients. Table 9 demonstrates that in Pennsylvania
during the year 1989, 32.5% of bypass patients were admitted as emergency cases, 26.6% as
urgent cases, and 40.2% as elective cases (this distribution remains reasonably stable over the
years). Among all bypass patients, 93.1% were admitted with a principal diagnosis of coronary
atherosclerosis (CA, commonly referred to as clogged arteries), while 5.3% were admitted with
AMI.Together, thesediagnoses, CAandAMI,covermorethan98%ofallCABGcases. Among
the elective cases, 98.5% were admitted with a diagnosis of CA, while only 1% were admitted
with a diagnosis of AMI. A similar picture emerges for the substitute procedure PTCA. There
existsconsiderable patientheterogeneityacross admissiontypesand mostpatients(up to99.4%)
are admitted with either CA or AMI.
How can providers bias report cards in their favor by selecting elective patients? As in Dra-
nove et al. (2003), we assume that there exists a subset of patients with positive measure that are
admitted to hospital with heart problems (primary diagnoses of CA or AMI) and who qualify
for both CABG surgery and PTCA. This gives providers some ﬂexibility in assigning the ap-
propriate clinical procedure for incoming elective patients. The introduction of the report cards14 Y. CHEN, J. MEINECKE
inﬂuences this assignment rule: an elective patient who poses a bad risk is now weakly more
likely to be assigned to PTCA (or, put differently, a bad–risk patient is not more likely to be
assigned to CABG due to the report cards). Likewise, an elective patient who poses a good risk
is weakly more likely to be assigned to CABG (or, not more likely to be assigned to PTCA due
to the report cards). We proceed to test whether providers selected patients from the pool of
elective patients.
[Table 9 about here.]
Preliminary evidence that providers in Pennsylvania did not systematically choose elective
patients to bias report cards has already been given by Table 5. The incidence of elective surgery
for bypass patients changed insigniﬁcantly due to the report cards. This means that there was
neither a net inﬂow from the pool of elective patients with a diagnosis of CA or AMI into
CABG surgery, nor a net outﬂow. If, for example, providers reacted to the report cards by
moving relatively more good–risk elective patients into CABG surgery, then we would expect
to see an increase in the incidence of elective surgery for bypass patients. We do not ﬁnd such
an effect.
However, it is possible that selection into and out of the pool of elective patients did occur, but
that the effects cancelled each other out. While the incidence of elective surgery overall would
not change, the composition of elective patients receiving CABG surgery would shift to more
good–risk patients and fewer bad–risk patients. We can test for such a cancelation effect. If
providers select from the pool of elective patients, then we expect the mortality rate for patients
who underwent CABG surgery and who were admitted as elective cases to decline in response to
the report card. Just as before, if the econometric analysis detects a marked decline in mortality,
we would interpret this as evidence in support of the hypothesis of selection.
[Table 10 about here.]
Table 10 reports average partial effects of 0.26 and 0.22 percentage points—both insignif-
icant. If a redistribution of patient types did occur among elective patients, we would expect
negative average partial effects. However, our estimates, while positive, are indistinguishable
from zero. We conclude that providers did not select strategically and systematically from the
pool of patients admitted as elective cases.
5. DISCUSSION
Selection. While our ﬁnding that providers do not select patients is in contrast to previous em-
pirical studies, it is consistent with the theoretical results in Chen (2011), who points out that the
CABG report cards in Pennsylvania not only measure providers’ mortality rates, but also their
patient volumes (the number of CABG surgeries performed at the hospital). Chen shows that
hospitals need to trade off these two measures. Suppose that there are two hospitals of different
quality (high and low) with the same patient volume. The high–quality hospital will have a
lower mortality rate in CABG surgery than the low–quality hospital. If the low–quality hospital
wants to imitate the mortality rate of the high–quality hospital, it can do so by avoiding sicker
patients. This will drive down the patient volume measure, which will be revealed in the report
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hospital on both measures at the same time. Therefore, the low–quality hospital will not engage
in patient selection. The high–quality hospital, knowing this, has no incentive to select patients
either.
Secondly, the actual implementation of the CABG report cards by the PHC4 makes it dif-
ﬁcult for providers to exploit private information. We have argued that patient selection can
only be effective if it is based on a hospital’s private information. Yet the value of that private
information may be small given the rich clinical data that hospitals are required to provide to the
report card authority. Hospitals have to submit an admission severity group (ASG) categorical
score, which is constructed based on a complex combination of clinical parameters (including
laboratory test results, levels of glucose, or blood urea nitrogen) and comorbidities that are col-
lected by the hospital (see PHC4 1998). The ASG ranges from 0 (no risk of clinical instability)
to 4 (maximal risk of clinical instability) and also reﬂects, to a certain extent, a patient’s clinical
history (including histories of congestive heart failure, seizures, and surgeries). Given the rich
information that comprises the ASG score, it seems conceivable that it effectively serves as a
sufﬁcient statistic for private information. Consequently, the scope for the selection of patients
by hospitals could be small.
Another reason for the lack of patient selection by hospitals could be altruism. Theoretical
work by Newhouse (1970) describes hospitals as complex institutions that include quality of
care in their objective functions. This introduces a bias against producing lower–quality prod-
ucts. Further, philanthropic funding arrangements enable non–proﬁt hospitals to deviate from
minimum average cost considerations and affords the hospital some latitude for inefﬁciency.
Frank and Salkever (1991) develop two models of altruism: pure and impure. In pure altruism,
a hospital only cares about ﬁlling the demand for charity care. If other hospitals increase their
supply of charity care, then a given hospital will accordingly reduce its supply. The crowding–
out effect is therefore perfect. However, such an extreme crowding–out effect is not supported
empirically. As such, Frank and Salkever also propose a model of impure altruism in which hos-
pitals perceive it as beneﬁcial to offer charity care themselves, competing for public goodwill
by providing and ﬁlling the gap for charity care. In contrast to pure (non–competitive) altru-
ism, the crowding–out effect of charity care is smaller and better supported empirically. Rosko
(2004) uses Pennsylvanian data from 1995 to 1998 to ﬁnd empirical evidence in support of im-
pure altruism: a given hospital’s supply of uncompensated care increases with the provision of
uncompensated care by other hospitals. Rosko also ﬁnds that non–proﬁt hospitals tap into ﬁ-
nancial surpluses to offer uncompensated care to patients. Lastly, Gaskin (1997) gives empirical
evidence from New Jersey during the years 1987 to 1992 that supports hospital altruism. New
Jersey introduced uncompensated care pools out of which hospitals receive reimbursements for
uncompensated care. In response, hospitals increased inpatient uncompensated care by almost
15% on average. Gaskin argues that the introduction of this pool lowered the shadow price for
altruistic care.
Lastly, the absence of selection may be explained by a lack of knowledge on part of the
hospitals. Hospitals may not know that performance data were being collected and/or they may
notknowthatresultswouldbepublished. However, eitherofthesepossibilitiesareunlikely. The
PHC4 consists of members from the medical community in Pennsylvania, it consults publicly16 Y. CHEN, J. MEINECKE
and disseminated research ideas in collaboration with the hospitals to encourage feedback and
enable wider acceptance of its work. Further, as explicitly required by Act 89 of 1986, the
PHC4 is essentially set up as a public entity. Its meetings are open to the public, its reports
are published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, and all its actions have to be taken in open public
sessions (see Sessa and Bentley 1992 and Sirio et al. 1996).
Quality Improvements. Given that the PHC4 uses actual in–hospital mortality as the main out-
come measure, rather than improving follow–up care (after patient discharge), hospitals should
focus on improving surgical procedures and immediate pre– and post–surgery care. If, instead,
hospitals were to invest in improving follow–up procedures after patient discharge, then any
reductions in mortality rates would not be reﬂected in the report cards. Examples of potential
quality improvement in bypass surgery include: the hiring of full–time cardiac surgery chiefs to
review and redesign the cardiac care systems; retraining of nurses; concentrating pre–surgery,
surgery, and post–surgery procedures on a single hospital ﬂoor; installing dedicated cardiac
anesthesia services (see Chassin 2002).
However, considering the short time frame used in our analysis, it seems possible that any
steps undertaken by hospitals to improve quality have not manifested in lower mortality rates.
This argument is consistent with our insigniﬁcant estimation results. In a recent theoretical pa-
per, Gravelle and Sivey (2010) describe the possibility that even in an environment of competing
for–proﬁt hospitals, quality of care may not increase at all in response to public disclosure of the
hospitals’ qualities. In their model, patients prefer the higher–quality hospital regardless of the
magnitude of the quality difference. Given this, when the initial quality difference between two
hospitals is sufﬁciently high, hospitals lack incentives to improve quality. The reason is that any
effort the lower–quality hospital exerts to improve its quality of care can only reduce the quality
gap, but can never fully close it.
Period 2–Effect. Our ﬁnding of no provider selection in period 1 does not necessarily mean
that there was no provider selection in period 2. Even if hospitals were aware of the timing of
the report card scheme, as report cards were still in their infancy, hospitals were facing uncer-
tainty with regard to the impact of the publication of the report cards on consumers. Following
publication of report cards, as public awareness grows, so may providers incentives to select
patients.
The effect of report card publication can be estimated, in principal, by comparing period 2
to period 0. To address this period 2–effect, we combine the years 1993 and 1994 as period
2 and apply the same estimation strategy as before. We ﬁnd that the average mortality rate
decreases from 5.77% to 4.77%. This means that the mortality rates for a patient from period
0 would decrease by 1.00 percentage point due to the publication of the report cards.10 These
ﬁndings are consistent with Dranove et al. (2003). Recall that Dranove et al. do a difference–in–
differences analysis in which they compare data from 1987–1992 (i.e., periods 0 and 1 jointly)
to data from 1993–1994 (period 2) and they also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect. In essence, Dranove
et al. estimate a pure period 2–effect: Given our main ﬁnding of a zero period 1–effect, the fact
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that Dranove et al. combine periods 0 and 1 in a comparison with period 2 is innocuous and
does yield results that are qualitatively identical to our comparison of period 0 and period 2.
This period 2–effect, however, has no clear interpretation yet as it confounds at least three
different factors: hospitals selecting patients, patients selecting hospitals, and quality improve-
ments by hospitals. Separating these factors for period 2 remains a future research direction.
6. CONCLUSION
The PHC4 predicted two outcomes of report cards for CABG surgery: the provision of pa-
tients “with data that will help them have more informed discussions with their physicians” and
the prompting of “providers to take steps to improve the overall quality of bypass surgery”.
Economists have pointed out a third and unintended consequence: a shift in bypass surgery
from sicker patients to healthier ones. These three report card effects—patients selecting hospi-
tals, quality improvement, and hospitals selecting patients—are difﬁcult to separate in empirical
work. We exploit a short period of asymmetric information during the implementation of Penn-
sylvania’s report card scheme to shut down the ﬁrst of the three effects. We compare mortality
outcomes of bypass patients from before the implementation of report cards to the period during
which the PHC4 collected patient outcome data but prior to the publication of results. During
this period, the report cards cannot have altered patients’ choice of providers. We then proceed
to test for improvement in the quality of patient care and for selection of patients by providers
jointly. Through both channels, the introduction of report cards had the potential to decrease
average illness severity of bypass patients and therefore mortality outcomes. However, in our
empirical analysis, we ﬁnd no such signiﬁcant negative effect. We conclude that neither quality
improvements nor patient selection occurred. In our empirical strategy, we explicitly account
for clustering of the policy variable at the state/year level. We adapt Wooldridge’s (2006) ef-
ﬁcient non–linear minimum distance estimation and provide detailed asymptotic derivations in
the Appendix.
We believe that our approach applies to many other report card schemes—some examples
include: the Los Angeles’ Department of Health Services restaurant hygiene grade cards from
1998; theCareQualityCommission’scollectionofinformationonthequalityofNationalHealth
Service hospitals in the United Kingdom and the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Re-
porting Authority’s My School website, launched in 2010 and publishing nationally comparable
data on almost 10,000 schools. Our asymptotic derivations can be adapted readily.18 Y. CHEN, J. MEINECKE
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APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF STANDARD ERRORS ON AVERAGE MORTALITY RATES
AND AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS
A.1. First–Stage estimation. First, we estimate the parameters in equation (3.3). For each
state separately we pool data across all available years and run a logit of mist on a constant, a set
of hospital characteristics, a set of time dummies, and patient characteristics. (We do not include
the derivations for the linear probability model here. Given the results for the logit model, the
linear probability model follows straightforwardly.) For state s, denote by Nhst the total number
of patients in hospital h observed during yeart and by Hst the total number of hospitals observed
during year t. Then the total number of patients observed during year t equals Nst := NhstHst.
Deﬁne by Hs the total number of hospitals observed in state s over all years. Let Ts be the
number of years observed in the data for state s. Then the total number of observations available
for state s equals Ns := NstTs.
Suppose each vector zihst has dimension Rs, where Rs is the number of patient characteris-
tics included for state s (we deﬁne vectors as column vectors). We stack vectors in the fol-
lowing order. At the hospital level, deﬁne a stacked matrix of patient characteristics zhst :=
(z1hst;:::;zNhsthst)0. At the year level, deﬁne a stacked matrix of patient characteristics zst :=
(z0
1st;:::;z0
Hstst)0. At the state level, deﬁne a stacked matrix of patient characteristics zs :=
(z0
s1;:::;z0
sTs)0. Note that dim(zs) = NsRs.
For each state we now deﬁne a bijective mapping from the index set Ks := f1;2;:::;Nsg
to the set of ordered triples ONs := f(i;h;t)ji 2 f1;:::;Nhstg;h 2 f1;:::;Hstg; t 2 f1;:::;Tsgg,
ks : Ks 7! ONs. We can therefore write each element of zs as zks with k 2 Ks. (In what follows,
the distinction between zst and zks whenever (s;t) or (k;s) take on speciﬁc numbers will be clear
from the context.)
Deﬁne a Ts-dimensional vector of year dummies, et








ks)0 and the deﬁnitions of mks, cks, and uks are analogous to the deﬁnition of
































where F(y) := exp(y)=(1+exp(y)) and f(y) := exp(y)=(1+exp(y))2 are from the logit
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that solves, for a given s, å
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due to the information matrix equality. By the analogy principle (see Goldberger (1968)), a
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Let t = 1;2;:::;Ts. With the estimator ˆ qs = ( ˆ q1s; ˆ q2s;:::; ˆ qTss)0 in hand we can construct an
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To derive the asymptotic distribution of dst deﬁne by Ls the Ts-dimensional identity matrix
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s. Similar to before, we apply apply large N-asymptotics, which yields
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A.2. Second–Stage Estimation. In the second stage we obtain ˆ b based on equation (3.2) by
efﬁcient minimum distance estimation. In order to set up the minimum distance estimator prop-
erly, denote by es a (D(S 1))-dimensional matrix of state dummies, by et a (D(T  1))-
dimensional matrix of time dummies (T := maxsfTsg), and by ep a (D1)-dimensional policy
dummy that takes on value one if s and t correspond to the treatment state in the treatment
period and zero otherwise. Next, deﬁne a (D(S+T))-dimensional matrix x that collects all
these dummy variables and also a constant term, i.e., x := (1;es;et;ep). The efﬁcient minimum
distance estimator is deﬁned as
ˆ y := argmin ˜ y





ˆ d  x ˜ y

;
where y := (m;a2;:::;aS;b2;:::;bT;b)0 from equation (3.2). The asymptotic distribution of
the efﬁcient minimum distance estimator is
p
N( ˆ y  y)




Toobtaintheasymptoticdistributionof ˆ b, letl bethe(S+T)-dimensionalvector(0;0;:::;0;1)0.
Then b = l0y and
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A.3. Average Partial Effects. To derive standard errors on APEA and APEB we ﬁrst propose
standard errors on the AMRs. In doing so, we keep notation as generic as possible to facilitate
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s Nst. We can therefore index all variables by j instead, for example, zjs
with j 2 J
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The derivations here are similar to Papke and Wooldridge (2008). In order to derive an
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which, by the analogy principle, we estimate by















For notational conciseness we deﬁne wjs := (c0
js;z0
js)0 and ls := (f0
s;g0
s)0. Next, consider the




















































where ˜ y lies between y and ˆ y and ˜ ls lies between ls and ˆ ls. Noting that the asymptotic

















































































































where rsp := N
p
s =N. Note that, as a corollary from minimum distance estimation,
p
N( ˆ y  
y) = (xW 1x0) 1xW 1p
N(ˆ d  d). Recall that d := (d0
1;:::;d0
S)0 and that ds := Lsqs. We can
thus construct an expression Lq = d with L being the block diagonal matrix whose diagonal
elements are the individual Ls. Thence,
p
N( ˆ y  y) = M
p
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d   ! N(0;G+BXB0):
Estimators for the terms in the asymptotic variance follow immediately:






































stq ˆ y +w0
jˆ ls

ˆ X := r 1
sp Lˆ ¡L0:24 Y. CHEN, J. MEINECKE
Asymptotic distributions for the estimates of the average partial effects, APEA and APEB,
now follow straightforwardly because they are merely linear combinations between different
average mortality rates AMRpq.
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Period 0: before 1990





Policy has ‘period 1–effect’.
Period 2: after 1992
Report cards issued.
Policy has ‘period 2–effect’.
t = 1990 t = 1992
Figure 1: Timing of Report Card Policy in Pennsylvania26 Tables
Table 1. —Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) Data Coverage
Calendar States covered Number of Number of
year hospitals in–patient stays
1988 CA, CO, FL, IL, IA, MA NJ, WA 759 5,265,756
1989 AZ, CA, CO, FL, IL, IA, MA NJ, PA, WA, WI 882 6,110,064
1990 AZ, CA, CO, FL, IL, IA, MA NJ, PA, WA, WI 871 6,268,515
1991 AZ, CA, CO, FL, IL, IA, MA NJ, PA, WA, WI 859 6,156,188
1992 AZ, CA, CO, FL, IL, IA, MA NJ, PA, WA, WI 856 6,195,744
Note.—Source: NIS documentation, release 3.Tables 27
Table 2. —Descriptive Statistics: Control States
Variable 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Male 51.7 51.8 52.2 52.7 53.0
White 86.0 83.8 82.0 83.2 84.8
Age 74.4 74.6 74.7 74.8 74.9
Emergency 49.2 51.1 52.0 51.7 52.0
Urgent 33.8 32.0 32.9 32.8 32.4
Elective 15.7 15.8 14.6 15.0 15.3
Principal procedure
CABG 11.2 10.9 11.8 12.6 12.9
PTCA 7.5 8.5 10.0 11.4 12.5
CATH 16.7 17.1 17.4 17.7 18.0
Died
CABG 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.5
PTCA 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6
CATH 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
N 195,461 152,964 157,802 164,826 168,116
Note.—All numbers in percent (except sample size N). Sample: Patients, age 65–99 who
have received principal diagnoses of acute myocardial infarction, coronary atheroscle-
rosis, non–speciﬁc chest pain, pulmonary heart disease, other and ill-deﬁned heart dis-
ease, conduction disorders, cardiac dysrhythmias, cardiac arrest and ventricular ﬁbril-
lation, or congestive heart failure (non–hypertensive). Control states included are only
those that were always in the NIS sample between 1988 and 1992 (i.e., CA, CO, FL,
IL, IA, MA NJ, WA). Variable ‘White’ for control states based on CA, IA, MA, NJ
only. Variables ‘Emergency’, ‘Urgent’, and ‘Elect’ for control states based on CA, FL,
IL, MA, NJ, WA only. See main text for explanation of procedure acronyms.28 Tables
Table 3. —Descriptive Statistics: Pennsylvania
Variable 1989 1990 1991 1992
Male 47.8 50.0 50.3 51.1
Age 74.2 74.1 74.3 74.4
Emergency 58.6 58.5 58.8 59.9
Urgent 23.0 20.2 21.4 22.4
Elective 15.3 18.8 19.3 17.6
Principal procedure
CABG 10.8 12.6 13.1 13.7
PTCA 7.1 9.6 10.3 11.2
CATH 15.4 16.6 17.1 18.1
Died
CABG 5.8 5.4 4.9 4.7
PTCA 1.7 1.0 1.5 1.7
CATH 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.5
N 23,256 28,839 29,953 30,983
Note.—All numbers in percent (except sample size N). Sample: Pa-
tients, age 65–99 who have received principal diagnoses of acute
myocardial infarction, coronary atherosclerosis, non–speciﬁc chest
pain, pulmonary heart disease, other and ill-deﬁned heart disease,
conduction disorders, cardiac dysrhythmias, cardiac arrest and ven-
tricular ﬁbrillation, or congestive heart failure (non–hypertensive).
Variable ‘White’ not available for PA. See main text for explanation





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5. —Estimation Results: Patient Characteristics
Characteristic ˆ b Conﬁdence interval
Demographics
Age 65–69 0.0054 [ -0.0458 ; 0.0565 ]
Age 70–74 -0.0023 [ -0.0520 ; 0.0474 ]
Age 75–79 0.0011 [ -0.0412 ; 0.0434 ]
Male 0.0017 [ -0.0481 ; 0.0515 ]
Admission type
Emergency 0.0053 [ -0.0432 ; 0.0537 ]
Urgent -0.0685 [ -0.1153 ; -0.0217 ]
Elective 0.0220 [ -0.0295 ; 0.0735 ]
Clinical/comorbidities
AMI 0.0160 [ -0.0101 ; 0.0421 ]
Complications -0.0707 [ -0.1209 ; -0.0204 ]
Peripheral vascular disorders -0.0069 [ -0.0275 ; 0.0138 ]
Hypertension 0.0063 [ -0.0358 ; 0.0483 ]
Chronic pulmonary disease -0.0032 [ -0.0324 ; 0.0260 ]
Diabetes, uncomplicated 0.0058 [ -0.0275 ; 0.0390 ]
Fluid and electrolyte disorders -0.0325 [ -0.0531 ; -0.0119 ]
Note.—Sample: CABG patients, age 65–99. Conﬁdence interval at 95% level. N =
121;900.Tables 31
Table 6. —Estimation Results: Second Stage
Procedure Functional ˆ b Conﬁdence N
form F() interval
CABG LPM -0.0008 [ 0:0111;0:0095] 121,900
Logit -0.0104 [ 0:2180;0:1973]
PTCA LPM -0.0030 [ 0:0098;0:0037] 101,122
Logit -0.1623 [ 0:6188;0:2941]
CATH LPM -0.0019 [ 0:0068;0:0029] 172,534
Logit -0.1245 [ 0:4376;0:1885]
Note.—Sample: CABG/ PTCA/ CATH patients, age 65–99. LPM: linear proba-
bility model. Conﬁdence interval at 95% level.32 Tables
Table 7. —Estimation Results: Average Mortality Rates and
Average Partial Effects
PANEL A: — CABG
Parameter Point estimate 95% Conﬁdence interval
AMR00 5.84 [ 5.49 ; 6.20 ]
AMR01 5.79 [ 5.49 ; 6.08 ]
APEA -0.05 [ -0.52 ; 0.41 ]
AMR10 5.05 [ 4.71 ; 5.39 ]
AMR11 5.00 [ 4.85 ; 5.16 ]
APEB -0.05 [ -0.43 ; 0.33 ]
N = 121;900
PANEL B: — PTCA
Parameter Point estimate 95% Conﬁdence interval
AMR00 1.65 [ 1.41 ; 1.88 ]
AMR01 1.41 [ 1.25 ; 1.58 ]
APEA -0.24 [ -0.52 ; 0.06 ]
AMR10 1.69 [ 1.44 ; 1.94 ]
AMR11 1.45 [ 1.35 ; 1.55 ]
APEB -0.24 [ -0.51 ; 0.03 ]
N = 101;122
PANEL C: — CATH
Parameter Point estimate 95% Conﬁdence interval
AMR00 1.82 [ 1.63 ; 2.01 ]
AMR01 1.62 [ 1.47 ; 1.77 ]
APEA -0.20 [ -0.44 ; 0.04 ]
AMR10 1.68 [ 1.51 ; 1.85 ]
AMR11 1.50 [ 1.41 ; 1.58 ]
APEB -0.18 [ -0.37 ; 0.00 ]
N = 172;534
Note.—Sample: CABG/ PTCA/ CATH patients, age 65–99. AMR re-
ported in percent; APE in percentage points.Tables 33
Table 8. —Estimation Results: Average Mortality Rates and
Average Partial Effects (CABG only)
PANEL A: — ALL HOSPITALS
Parameter Point estimate 95% Conﬁdence interval
AMR00 5.83 [ 5.47 ; 6.20 ]
AMR01 5.67 [ 5.36 ; 5.99 ]
APEA -0.16 [ -0.65 ; 0.33 ]
AMR10 5.06 [ 4.71 ; 5.41 ]
AMR11 4.92 [ 4.75 ; 5.09 ]
APEB -0.14 [ -0.53 ; 0.25 ]
N = 106;092
PANEL B: — WORST 25% HOSPITALS
Parameter Point estimate 95% Conﬁdence interval
AMR00 9.59 [ 8.52 ; 10.65 ]
AMR01 8.74 [ 7.71 ; 9.76 ]
APEA -0.85 [ -2.33 ; 0.63 ]
AMR10 8.51 [ 7.43 ; 9.59 ]
AMR11 7.75 [ 7.10 ; 8.40 ]
APEB -0.76 [ -2.03 ; 0.50 ]
N = 20;162
PANEL C: — BEST 25% HOSPITALS
Parameter Point estimate 95% Conﬁdence interval
AMR00 3.10 [ 2.51 ; 3.69 ]
AMR01 2.59 [ 2.19 ; 2.98 ]
APEA -0.52 [ -1.23 ; 0.20 ]
AMR10 4.81 [ 3.83 ; 5.79 ]
AMR11 4.03 [ 3.70 ; 4.36 ]
APEB -0.78 [ -1.81 ; 0.25 ]
N = 27;306
Note.—Sample: CABG patients, age 65–99. AMR reported in percent;
APE in percentage points.34 Tables
Table 9. —Descriptive Statistics: Principal Diagnosis and Admis-






Principal diagnosis: All patients
CA 93.1 84.3
AMI 5.3 14.0




Note.—All numbers in percent (except sample size N). Sample: Patients, age 65–
99 who received CABG or PTCA in Pennsylvania in 1989. Acronyms: CA =
coronary atherosclerosis, AMI = acute myocardial infarction.Tables 35
Table 10. —Estimation Results: Average Mortality Rates
and Average Partial Effects (CABG only)
Parameter Point estimate 95% Conﬁdence interval
AMR00 4.37 [ 3.83 ; 4.92 ]
AMR01 4.63 [ 4.16 ; 5.11 ]
APEA 0.26 [ -0.46 ; 0.98 ]
AMR10 3.72 [ 3.20 ; 4.24 ]
AMR11 3.94 [ 3.69 ; 4.18 ]
APEB 0.22 [ -0.35 ; 0.80 ]
N = 39;548
Note.—CABG Patients, age 65–99. AMR reported in percent; APE in
percentage points.